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Pricing Federal Irrigation Water 
Forecasts of California's water supply and 
demand to the year 2000 predict ample 
overall supplies but an uneven geographic 
distribution of those resources. These studies 
warn of chronic shortages for some naturally 
arid areas, especially southern California, by 
the late 1980's. Most responses to this prob-
lem call for expanding the supply of water by 
building new dams and canals, but an alter-
native approach could be to reduce the 
projected demand for water by reforming the 
existing pricing system. 
In California, agriculture uses about 85 per-
cent of  th~ total water consumed annually. 
Forty percent of  this agricultural water is 
supplied by the Cemral Valley Project (CVP) 
and sold at wholesale by the federal Bureau 
of Reclamation. The water is purchased by 
irrigation districts and other utilities which in 
turn sell the water at retail to farmers. Thus the 
pricing of federal irrigation water has a direct 
effect on the ultimate demand for water in 
California. This Letter will describe the 
existing pricing practices and propose more 
efficient alternative methods. It concludes 
with a discussion of some implications of 
higher water prices for the demand for irri-
gation water and the future development of 
the CVP system. 
Water subsidies 
The Bureau is currently receiving an average 
of about $5.09 for each acre-foot of CVP 
irrigation water. This price recovers the 
annual cost of operation and maintenance 
and some of  the cost of plant and equipment 
(valued at their original cost), but still repre-
sents a substantial subsidy to farmers. 
The actual average cost of the CVP water is 
about $24 per acre-foot when calculated 
using the model prescribed by regulatory 
commissions for private investor-owned util-
ities and assuming, as in the case of the CVP, 
that the investment in facilities is financed 
solely through long-term debt. This "full his-
torical" average cost consists of annual 
operation and maintenance costs, steady 
amortization of debt, interest and property 
taxes divided by the number of units of water 
expected to be sold in a given period. 
The difference between the historical average 
cost and the price realized results from a 
number of  public subsidies. The Reclamation 
Act of 1902 required water users to repay the 
construction costs of  federal irrigation proj-
ects but not the interest on that investment. 
This interest subsidy amounts to the average 
rate paid by private utilities for new bond 
issues, which for Aaa public utility bonds has 
ranged from an average yield of 2.6 to 15.6 
percent over the 1948-81 period. 
The Reclamation Act of 1936 further limited 
farmers' obligations to their "ability to pay." 
Under this concept, the Bureau subtracts 
from the increased gross income attributable 
to project water the increase in non-water 
costs required to boost farm yields. The non-
water costs, as calculated by the Bureau, 
include additional operating and capital 
costs and a rate of profit projected to be suffi-
cient to encourage the farmer to increase 
farm yields. The Bureau then charges the irri-
gation district its estimates of  the cost of ser-
vice or the "ability to pay" price, whichever 
is lower. Reclamation law allows the Bureau 
to shift part of any shortfall to other water 
users, e.g., municipalities and electric power 
customers. 
In addition, the Bureau offers irrigation dis-
tricts long-term purchase contracts with rates 
fixed for specific periods of time, usually 40-
years. These fixed rate contracts do not allow 
recovery of increased operational, mainten-
ance and new-facility costs as these occur. 
The Bureau also does not pay, and therefore 
pass on, local property taxes. This contrasts 
with private water utilities in California for 
which property taxes averaged 2.6 percent of 
their total annual plant investment between 
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1960 and 1977 and 1.7 percent during the 
1978-81 period after the passage of Proposi-
tion 13. 
Finally, the Bureau, while required by law to 
repay each dollar appropriated by Congress 
for investment in irrigation facilities within 50 
years after the first delivery of water, has not 
repaid such borrowings systematically. In 
some years, its low rates have not even re-
covered annual operating and maintenance 
costs, also required by law. As a result, the 
Bureau has been forced to extend the repay-
ment life for all CVP irrigation facilities each 
time new facilities were added. 
With adjustments made for imputed property 
taxes, amortization and interest costs, the 
CVP actually incurred full average unit costs, 
on an historical accounting method, of at 
least $23.77/acre-foot of irrigation water in 
1981. This means the general taxpayer pro-
vided a total estimated annual subsidy of $77 
million for 1981, and of $966 million on a 
cumulative basis for the life of the project, 
1948-1981. 
Aver:age replacement cost 
The historical (original) average cost pricing 
method, while a traditional way of  recovering 
capital costs, under-estimates the value of 
resources in periods of rapid inflation. In such 
periods, the replacement cost of existing 
plant and equipment is far higher than the 
original cost of that equipment. Pricing irri-
gation water at the average replacement cost 
of supplying that water would capture the 
increased value. 
The replacement value of the CVP is esti-
mated to be $1.7 billion. This is the aggregate 
value of past plant investments in 1981 
dollars. The replacement value divided by 
the total acre-feet of water delivered in 1981 
yields the average replacement cost of 
$48/acre-foot. Using this measure of average 
cost, which includes the true costs to society 
embodied by the CVP, yields a total subsidy 
of nearly $175 million in 1981  alone. 
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Expansion costs 
In economic theory, the appropriate pricing 
method when the scale of a production plant 
is to be increased is by long-run incremental 
cost. This pricing practice makes customers 
aware of  the economic valueofthe resources 
required to supply the additional increments, 
and provides them with the proper price 
signals for efficient choices among different 
expenditures. In the case of  the CVP, this cost 
is the cost of supplying water with the next 
block of new storage and conveyance faci I  i-
ties scheduled to be added. 
One of  the additions to the Central Valley 
Project under consideration is the proposed 
Auburn-Folsom South Unit which consists of 
a dam, canal and several smaller structures. 
We have estimated the long-run incremental 
cost of  this Unit by first discounting the future 
stream of  annual costs (in 1981 dollars) by 10 
percent, the real rate prescribed by the Office 
of Management and Budget for evaluating 
Federal projects. This calculation yields the 
present value of all costs of the addition over 
its life. Second, we multiplied the present 
value by the real rate of interestto arrive atthe 
real annual cost of investing resources in this 
project rather than using them elsewhere. 
Third, we divided this annual cost by the 
project's expected annual output for an esti-
mated long-run incremental cost of $324/ 
acre-foot. 
The high long-run incremental cost of water 
in California suggests two problems. First, 
average cost pricing even without subsidies 
obscures the cost of adding additional capac-
ity because it blends or averages the cost of 
old and new capacity. Incremental cost 
pricing in contrast reflects only the higher 
cost of  the new capacity required to increase 
the supply of water. Second, the present 
. highly subsidized prices may have spurred 
consumption beyond the growth that wou  Id 
otherwise have occurred. In other words, 
standard economic analysis indicates agri-
cultural benefits have not warranted the 
amount of resources devoted to the construc-
tion of  the Federal irrigation system in 
California. Watering less 
If efficiency of resource allocation were the 
only criterion, the Bureau of ReClamation 
should price all irrigation water from the Cen-
tral Valley Project on the basis of long-run 
incremental cost. However, the resulting 
high price would not only greatly shrink 
water usage but also the size of California's 
agricultural sector. Moreover, present regula-
tions enjoin public utilities from making a 
profit, the result of long-run incremental costs 
exceeding the average costs of supplyinR . 
water. 
The second-best option from an efficiency 
standpoint is to price irrigation water at the 
average replacement cost. This method 
would at least recover the cost of resources 
already embodied by the system and enable 
the Bureau to generate enough revenue to 
perpetuate the existing capacity. It would eli-
minate the substantial subsidies now in 
effect. 
Pricing on the basis of average replacement 
cost would make consumers aware of  the 
resources already expended and give farmers 
a much stronger incentive to conserve water. 
Empirical studies show that the demand for 
irrigation water responds significantly to 
price changes where retail prices exceed 
$20/acre-foot. One study found that between 
$25 and $35/acre-foot, a 1 percent increase 
in price wou  Id resu It in a 1.5 percent· 
decrease in consumption. Given a demand 
of  3.8 million acre-feet at $25 per acre-foot, a 
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tity demanded by 570,000 acre-feet, suffi-
cient to eliminate the need for the proposed 
Auburn-Folsom project. 
Sharply higher water prices might induce 
farmers to use less water by reducing output 
or adopting more efficient irrigation methods. 
They might also cause farmers to shift to less 
water-intensive crops or to withdraw land 
from irrigation. Water costs make up a rela-
tively large proportion ofthetotal production 
costs of  field crops such as hay, wheat, and 
corn. On the other hand, water costs com-
prise a relatively small percentage of  the total 
costs of  tomatoes, peaches, lettuce, grapes, 
and nuts. In response to higher water prices, 
farmers might move toward specialty crops 
such as the latter. They also would probably 
use less water on hay, wheat, and corn be-
cause California's farmers have too small a 
share of  the total domestic production of 
these field crops to raise market prices and 
pass added water costs onto consumers. 
The social objective of  developing the arid 
West may no longer be an appropriate reason 
for subsidizing agricultural water prices. 
Recent Congressional debate on reform of 
reclamation law has focused on the size of 
farms that should receive subsidies. With 
households and ene~gy  producers competing 
with farmers for water, Congress should 
logically give more attention to the role of  the 
price mechanism in reducing the projected 
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PRICING IRRIGATION WATER  TO REDUCE 
DEMAND AND RECOVER COSTS 
3 BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT 
(Dollar amounts. in millions) 
Selected Assets and Liabilities 
large Commerci~1  Banks 
Loans (gross, adjusted) and investments* 
Loans (gross, adjusted) - total # 
Commercial and industrial 
Real estate 
Loans to individuals 
Securities loans 
U.S. Treasury securities* 
Other securities* 
Demand deposits - total# 
Demand deposits - adjusted 
Savings deposits - total 
Time deposits - total# 
Individuals, part. & corp. 






































Weekly Averages  Weekended  Weekended 
of Daily Figures  8/11/82  8/4/82 
Member Bank Reserve Position 
Excess Reserves (-)/Deficiency (-)  - 212  94 
Borrowings  79  76 
Net free reserves (  - )/Net borrowed  (  - )  - 291  18 
* Excludes trading account securities. 
#  Includes items not shown separately.  . 
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Change from 
year ago 
Dollar  Percent 
9,376  6.2 
10,395  8.U 
4,953  12.5 
3,354  6.2 
493  2.2 
1,281  96.6 
305  5.0 
1,324  - 8.9 
1,038  2.6 
1,292  - 4.5 
859  2.9 
13,517  15.8 
12,357  16.0 
2,046  5.8 
Comparable 
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